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not merely intense, but comprehensive, not merely personal, but human, not merely novel, but true. To guide thought and life thus, is to exhibit in concrete form the faith which sees in the present distraction of culture not the symptoms of decay, but the condition of advance. The great of the future, if such there are to be, will inherit from the great of the past. And the material of the present will be the binding link. They will be made possible, therefore, in just the degree to which we grasp the actual material of our own life and form it. In a word, we must, in whatever exploration or pioneering we do, endeavor to let our work be the centre of as much as possible; and refuse to let that pass for work whose affinity with life is narrow and whose range of influence is small. We shall not suffer for that. After all, the total measure of our human good is the amount of life we possess. Our vessel will be full in proportion as we succeed in placing ourselves where the streams of human interest converge. In their own day, the great of the past stood there. And the position we seek, must lie in their direction. It may be more advanced than theirs; it may be in a hundred ways different; but if we are either to be ourselves in the really rich veins of life, or to leave for the great who are to come the material which they can use to the salvation of the world, we must stand in the same line.

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THE IDENTITY OF THE IDEALS.

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THE thesis of this paper is that the ideals of life,—of truth and beauty and virtue,—are identical as regards form or the demands which they set to the concrete will. The difference in our ideal activities lies, not in their form, but in the specific end in which human nature

strives to embody the ideals,—the discovery of truth with its characteristic satisfaction, the creation and joy of beauty, and the making of a social character with its concomitant happiness. In short, the content, not the form, differentiates the ideals.

I. There have been various efforts in the past both towards the unification and the differentiation of the ideals. But both types of effort have been largely futile from the failure to distinguish between the form and the content of ideal activity, between the ideal demands and their concrete embodiments. A word first about the attempts at identification. The kinship of ideals was felt by the ancient Hebrew psalmist in the striking invitation: "Oh, worship the Lord in the beauty of holiness." But we do not look for abstract analysis in this quarter. We are reminded of a similar poetic identification by Voltaire: "Only truth is beautiful, only virtue is loveable." We naturally look to the philosophers for systematic statement. Here too, however, the identification will be found to be intuitional and fragmentary.

Plato shares with his Greek background the feeling that the good and true and beautiful are somehow one. In the 'Protagoras' he strives to identify the virtues as knowledge, for it is knowledge that must furnish the measure in the evaluation of goods; and insight when present cannot fail to control conduct. Hence the problem of virtue becomes the problem of education. By implication all the values of life are here reduced to truth. In the 'Philebus' he identifies beauty and virtue in terms of their common denominator: "Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over." In the 'Philebus' and the 'Republic' he makes the good the final genus, including under it truth, virtue, and beauty. In the 'Symposium,' beauty, with its intoxicating contemplation, becomes the supreme ideal. But these are merely brilliant intuitions,—looking now to the form, now to the content of the ideals for unity.

In modern times Shaftesbury has summarized for us

the Greek point of view as regards this essential kinship of the ideals. "What is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is of consequence agreeable and good." But this statement too is impressionistic. It fails to divorce form and content; and as regards the latter fails to furnish the differentia. It amounts to only a *feeling* for the kinship of the ideals. It does not unravel the problem. The same Greek feeling is to be found in the poet Schiller, as regards the kinship of beauty and virtue, where, on the one hand, beauty refines us into virtue and, on the other, the virtuous life must be looked upon in its perfect stage as the beautiful soul. Lotze, in like manner, feels the kinship of truth and beauty. For him the ultimate self-evidence of the unity of truth "must no longer be called logical but esthetic and accordingly will find the touchstone of its validity no longer in the unthinkable, but in the plain absurdity of its contrary." And again: "The coherence of the many single elements of truth which enables them to be ranged under a simple fundamental idea may rest upon esthetic propriety."¹ Here too the relation is a matter of intuition, not of clearness and distinctness.

My revered teacher, the late C. C. Everett, came back to the problem of identification again and again. Thus he tells us: "Goodness and beauty are really manifestations of truth."² Again: "The three ideas of the reason are simply manifestations of one and the same principle. The first affirms that which is, the second that which ought to be, while in the third we find that which is as it ought to be, the fulfilled perfection."³ To this relation to the will I shall come back later, but what made Everett feel the kinship was the implication of unity in each ideal.

Lately there has been an attempt to identify the types of value from the biological point of view, sometimes in

¹ Lotze, "Logic" (Eng. Trans.), Vol. II, pp. 329-330.

² "The Psychol. Elements of Rel. Faith," p. 148.

³ *Ibid.*, 200.

terms of adjustment and sometimes in terms of satisfaction. But apart from the adequacy of the method, this is after all only the statement of the genus. It still remains to state the differentia in each case, whether of adjustments or satisfactions. Of course this must be done in terms of concrete values. At any rate the fancied unification is only vagueness.

II. If the efforts at unification of ideals have been intuitional and confused, so have the efforts at differentiation. Thus it has been suggested that the esthetic attitude differs from the scientific and moral in that the esthetic object is isolated and sufficient unto itself, while the other attitudes imply larger connections. But in no case can we isolate so as to cut off completely from the background of experience. This is the more of life, which our ideal abstraction is intended to make significant. In each case there must be the fringe, the suggestive value. Art is as meaningless as science, where the individual fails to bring the necessary equipment of experience. The object in any case is a focus of suggestion, an effort, not merely to suppress, but to control association in a definite direction. The suggestions, however, must grow out from the expressed relations,—the object, not from the mere label. They must be continuous with the object and germane to it,—intrinsic and not merely extrinsic, internal and not merely external to the theme. The savage and the child do not discover the beauty in the Angelus because they lack the background of experience to suggest its internal meaning.

Since our ideal strivings are meanings, they *must* in the nature of the case select and abstract such aspects as will make the rest significant. In a measure all idealization is isolation, emphasis. But they must suggest, too, the larger setting and unity. The whole is never the merely presented even in art. We might define art, with more truth, as companionship with the universe, to which the selected aspect furnishes the friendly introduction. Not merely what is presented, but rather what we bring

in the way of experience and demands, is what constitutes artistic creation and appreciation. The selected object is the focus, the nuclear constellation of content, which suggests the richness of concrete experience. All idealization is abstraction, but abstraction not for its own sake, but for the sake of making the concrete significant.

Since in each field the object is constituted by the selective interest, we cannot make this the differentia. In the case of each type of ideal realization, we must know the selective aim for the activity to have meaning. I saw little of merit in a painting before which I stood recently, until I read the subject, "Fleeting Shadows." And then it was marvelous. The artist had selected this aspect, the rest was foil. Lamb refused to admit that $2 \times 2 = 4$ until he knew what use was to be made of it. Whether true or not depends upon the selective aim. Of abstract quantities it is true, but not of human beings. Whether a deed is morally significant or not depends upon the aim. If done from impulse, it is a mere natural event like the falling stone. If done from motive, it indicates a good or mean character. Thus all ideals tend in part to abstract, isolate, frame. But they also have their larger individual and cosmic setting.

It has been customary to credit moral activity with the aim of improvement as contrasted with other types of ideal activity. But it must be clear now that, in neither case, do we take experience as we find it. In each case must the immediate be reconstructed in conformity with our ideal demands. In each case must there be selection, emphasis, suppression of motley details in order to make experience significant. In neither case do we make the facts or data. We create by selection; we bring out the promising relations; we experiment to express in terms of the presented material what we deeply and truly mean as idealizing selves.

Another attempt at differentiation of ideals is based upon their relation to attention. The esthetic ideal, for example, is held to be characterized by spontaneous at-

tention, unconscious creativeness, the immediate absorption of the will, while the scientific and ethical ideals, especially the latter, are held to involve active and strenuous attention. Attention, however, does not furnish conclusive differentia. The moral life cannot be distinguished from the esthetic by the sense of effort involved in the obedience to the moral law. We must be careful not to confuse points of view,—the point of view of the creative activity and that of the spectator of the result. The latter does not necessarily require effort in any case. As regards the former it may require effort in any ideal activity. Working by genius does not mean working without effort, even though genius is more than a dint for hard work. Artists do not necessarily dash off the results which we sometimes find it so easy to appreciate. Few realize the painstaking toil that has entered into what seems to us so spontaneous and satisfying. The original of many a stylist seems fairly lost in the corrections which overlay it. The artist may have spoiled many pictures, with heartrending consciousness lest he should miss the gleam, before he gave us this masterly result. Nor is it an unmistakable sign of art that we should enjoy it immediately,—as it were, love it at first sight. The first impression in the world of art is not, any more than in the world of truth, necessarily most worth while. In either case, the immediate hazy intuition must be made clear and distinct by analysis of the idea of the author in its various moments. This eventually brings back the sense of unity greatly enhanced. In the case of the moral life, temptation and effort may indicate only a bad education. They are no test of the worth of conduct. The really moral life finds socialized conduct, the proper volitional response, largely automatic,—a second nature controlling the primitive type. The sense of effort should be a transition stage to spontaneous obedience of the moral law. In any case idealized conduct means controlled or measured conduct, and this can only be had through training. At

the beginning of the ideal life the gods set labor. Spontaneous mastery, absorbed attention in the ideal object, in the case of any ideal activity, logical, esthetic, or moral, is the fruit of training and self-control. The feeling of effort indicates the novice. It has nothing to do with the worth of the activity. Some people could not give spontaneous attention to anything but rag time. That does not make them moral.

Each form of ideal activity has its ought, its sense of incompleteness, the command of the ideal, or, to use Professor Palmer's phrase, the command of the whole to the part. Beauty and truth as creative activities have their ought as well as the moral law,—their sense of failure, their feeling for potential wholeness, "which bids us neither sit nor stand but go" that we may attain the ideal. From life's larger point of view, at any rate, the poet, as well as the sick soul cowering before the categorical imperative, feels the discrepancy between what is and what ought to be. Hence the sense of fragmentariness, hence the effort at improvement. The ought characterizes all ideal realization in the process of becoming; and seldom, especially in the deeper genius, is the process complete. Tragic is the moment when he can say to his life's ideal: "*Verweile doch du bist so schön.*" Spontaneous genius seldom, if ever, exists outside of the story books.

Sometimes, indeed, for a limited purpose, the consciousness of discrepancy between attainment and ideal scarcely enters into the particular judgment. Sometimes a particular truth seems to come as a flash of intuition, the brief lyric pours itself into a final mold in an ecstatic birth of beauty, the good deed comes with a sense of enthusiasm and self-surrender instead of effort. Each viewed in its isolation seems final and satisfying. But such cases are exceptions, and, even so, are the gift of a previous set, subconsciously incubated in the meantime. Goethe's Faust required a life time of labor to produce and takes as long to appreciate.

As regards results, that is, life as a whole, here too no

sharp line can be drawn. It is no detraction from beauty that it has results on our larger activity. On the contrary, it inevitably has such results and must be judged in a measure by them. Art has no license to violate our other ideal demands. It must be true to science in dealing with an actual world. It cannot make its own anatomy or space perspective. It must be estimated in scientific terms, even though it is not science. So likewise must it be considered with reference to the larger race life. It has subserved and still subserves a use in race survival. As the grown man's play it has its important place in the economy of human life. To be beautiful an object must be idealized, *i. e.*, liberated from the sensuous. Its suggestion must be *ideal* suggestion. Thus it purifies. The same can be said of truth. Truth has its results, its larger setting in life. While it may not be pursued for its use, it has its use in making life more efficient. While it is not morality, it is a noble pursuit and gives dignity and calm to the soul. Nor is the moral ideal to be judged merely by effects. It is sometimes, notably in its highest instances, tragically out of accord with its temporary environment. Sometimes it is permanently impracticable, though nevertheless noble and inspiring. Extreme other-worldliness, 'love your enemies,' mystical union, *etc.*, may never become practical types, but nevertheless they furnish noble reliefs and corrective view-points to our workaday, prudential world.

If we try to differentiate the ideals from the point of view of development, we must be consistent. We must be careful to take them from the same standpoint. If we look at them as ideal results or in retrospect, they of course cannot develop. The past as such does not change. The hypothesis of Thales, whether true or mistaken, marks a mile post in science. The emancipation proclamation taken as a deed remains what it is. It may be evaluated as a historic event independent of the agent. So with the art work. Schubert's unfinished symphony is as finished as it is going to be.

If, however, we take the creative point of view, the particular results become moments in a life history. Hypotheses are steps in discovery, deeds are the marking places in the progressive realization of will, each successive work unfolds the larger motives and possibilities of the artist. Each Madonna of Raphael gives not only the spectator, but the artist an additional insight into his idealized conception of womanhood; and in the series we can see improvement, clearer consciousness of aim. Finished results,—absolutely finished,—are but an illusion from the creative point of view, a testimony to our limitations.

If you look again at ideal striving with reference to the plasticity of its world, it would seem at first glance as though we had struck a profound difference. Truth seems to most people to deal with a rigid, predetermined constitution, given outright, while in ethics, in a strenuous way, and in esthetics, in perhaps a genial way, we must somehow and to some extent alter the world to fit our ideals. The contrast, I think, is more superficial than real. Truth, so far as it is our activity, is a genuinely creative process. If there is an absolute truth, our efforts must indeed seem feeble copies to an omniscient spectator. But we have no first-hand knowledge of an absolute truth any more than we have an intuition of absolute beauty. So far as our finite experience is concerned, we create truth,—as we create institutions and art,—to meet our needs. In neither case do we proceed independent of experience. We must select out of its richness the significant aspects. In neither case do we make the laws arbitrarily, but rather discover their implications in our nature. In the last analysis, in either case, we may be imitating an absolute mind, but that does not alter our finite problem. The realm of truth is as plastic in the hands of the potter as the world of beauty. The seemingly more rigid character of the former is due to taking truth in retrospect instead of in prospect, as made rather than in the making.

The contrasts which we have examined have been made so striking by taking ideal activities from different points of view,—the point of view of the spectator being contrasted with that of the producer, the part-point of view with the whole-point of view, the point of view of effort with the point of view of mastery, the point of view of the internal meaning with the point of view of the external relations. We can look at any of our ideal activities from these and other points of view. We can, for example, look at beauty from the point of view of creative activity or from the point of view of the spectator or assimilator. So in the case of truth or virtue. We can look at separate results,—separate concepts, separate deeds, or separate pictures,—or we can regard them from the point of view of a self-realizing process of truth, beauty, and virtue. In any case we must be careful in comparing the ideals to adopt the same point of view for each comparison,—to compare development with development, creative activity with creative activity, finished product with finished product, etc. The confusing of points of view led to the failure of the above comparisons.

So long as we regard our ideal activities from the same point of view, we find that what we can say of one ideal in the way of formal characterization we can always say of the others. There may be pedagogical convenience in setting the ideals over against each other for certain purposes. But the difference finally does not lie in the form, but in the content. In our survey we have seen how some have emphasized the abstract character of truth as wholly abstract. Some have emphasized the selective character of art as complete isolation. Some have emphasized the infinite demand of the moral law and contrasted it with the finitude of our other ideals. But these are not fair contrasts. They are not made from the same point of view. The abstractions of truth must be made, as must the selections of art and virtue, in the service of attaining a larger insight into the concreteness of life, not for the sake of abstraction. Art, like truth and virtue, only

isolates for clearness and distinctness. The seeming isolation of the frame,—of the specific science, of the particular art work, of the particular life-conduct,—merges in its depths into the cosmic background and can be understood only with reference to this. The object as framed in the focus of attention serves but to suggest a vague sentiment or 'recollection' of the constitution of the universe which makes certain ideal demands upon itself through us and in which the sharp outlines of our abstraction fade into the moving, continuous woof of reality. The larger part of the meaning is always in the fringe. And if the ideal, as in the case of moral striving, appears as an infinite imperative, this is no less true of our other ideal demands in so far as we dwell upon the prospective, creative side and measure the felt potentialities of human nature in terms of its finite attainment. We must strive to bring clearness and distinctness not only into the ideal object, but we must bring such clearness and distinctness into the relations of the ideals themselves, and thus rescue them from the confusion of mixed view-points.

III. Having laid down the thesis that the ideals, as abstract or formal, are identical in all our striving for evaluation, we must now try to make clear what these ideals are. It will be seen on scrutiny that our ideal activity implies four demands which the object must meet. They may be stated as unity, harmony, simplicity, and universality. In the first place there must be *unity*. The various parts of the situation must be capable of being understood in terms of one idea, they must follow from a common principle or purpose which they are seen to embody. This can be shown in scientific synthesis, whether inductive or deductive. A generalization is never a mere collection or summary of particulars. The mere cinematographic registration of facts in repetitive memory does not constitute truth. The sequence of rain and sunshine, weddings and divorces, births and funerals is a meaningless show unless we can read the sequence in terms of

a universal. Events, in order to be science, must be seen to follow from an hypothesis, and the hypothesis from the events. They must, for our pragmatic purposes at least, embody an idea or tendency. Bodies must not merely fall, but they must be predictable in terms of a mathematical law; life must not merely present a riotous sequence of change, but there must be within it a tendency to change in definite ways. There must be overlapping, the unity of a universal.

The same is true in art. What we must first discover in the object of beauty is the idea expressed in the details, the universal embodied in the diversity of parts. This universal may not lie at the surface. You must live in the presence of the Sistine Madonna, you must be willing to give serious study to Hamlet, to grasp the significant unity. Else the Sistine painting is a collection of more or less pleasing figures, Hamlet a series of more or less interesting episodes. You can't go to sleep over the great master-pieces any more than over the great scientific hypotheses and grasp their significance. You must enter into the creative idea of the artist.

What is true of science and art is likewise true of virtue. The virtuous life is not a series of episodes,—of more or less beneficent impulsive acts. Such a life is non-moral. You must find the meaning, the motive, the idea to be realized in the multitude of events and choices. They must be strung on a universal in the light of which they can be interpreted. If you are taking account of life as a spectator, you must put yourself at the actor's point of view, or as nearly so as your human limitations permit. Not only through the ages, but through the acts of each individual will with which you strive to sympathize, there must run a purpose. The shallow excuse: I did not mean it, is an attempt to place oneself outside of moral responsibility. When it is clear that a deed follows from no principle, we not only individually, but legally, abandon the ethical criterion of good or bad. We see then that the first demand upon ideal activity, whether

taken from the agent's or the spectator's point of view, is the discovery of an idea or universal in the variety of facts.

In the second place, in all ideal activity there must be *harmony*,—the parts must support or reënforce each other within a whole. Take it first in the realm of science: Facts must lean on ideas, and ideas on facts. There must be fluency of transitions or adjustments. There must be not merely evidence, but organized disjunctive evidence, where the parts supplement and reënforce each other. And the evidence must be adequate. It must be proportional in complexity to the idea which it aims to support. We cannot rest a momentous hypothesis on slender evidence and feel security or ease in the relation any more than we can rest an immense edifice on slender pillars and have our will satisfied with the result.

Harmony in science means not merely organization within one hypothesis, but it means also that hypothesis must support and reënforce hypothesis within the overlapping fields of experience. Species must supplement each other, as well as individual lean upon individual within the larger kind which we strive to define. Harmony, organization, is therefore of the very nature of scientific system. One negative instance, one outstanding fact which fails to support the rest within the scope of the idea, destroys the idea's claim to express the facts of the kind and challenges to a new idea.

In art the importance of harmony is even more obvious. It is not enough that each part bears the imprint of the idea, like a heap of stamped bricks, but they must mutually reënforce the idea. In Guido Reni's "*Aurora*" every part testifies to the glory of the coming day. But more than that, each part helps to reënforce the idea. Movement, brilliancy, color, beauty of form, contrast,—all coöperate and converge to fasten the attention to the idea of nature's oft-repeated wonder. In dramatic opera the human voice, the instrumental music, the scenic setting, the acting,—all combine to reënforce the idea of

the composer. Let either be false, and the harmony is marred.

That harmony is essential to the moral life has been emphasized both by common speech and by the philosopher. The moral life is the balanced life, the rounded life, the life in which each tendency of human nature plays its proper part, each event receives its proper emphasis. Even with unity of motive a life can easily be marred by wrong emphasis, by making the trivial into the focal and the important into the by-play. The virtuous life is the life which gives each interest and moment its due. It is a just life. What harmony in each case,—logical, esthetic, and moral,—emphasizes is that each part has a claim which must be recognized; and in turn that no part must stand by itself. It *has* a claim, but it is a claim within a whole. The parts must support the principal idea; but this they can do only when the idea is adequate to incorporate the parts.

Again, all ideal activity demands *simplicity* or *economy*. The ideal tolerates nothing superfluous. It is jealous of its rights to express itself. Sometimes the characteristic of simplicity has been emphasized as all sufficient to define ideal activity. Truth is simple, beauty is simple, virtue is simple. So they are. But simplicity alone does not define these attitudes. In the first place, simplicity is meaningless until you specify your type of unity. It expresses the negative rather than the positive side of ideal selection. Again, simplicity does not necessarily mean agreement or harmony within the unity. We must not read the parts out of court, as has so often been done, for the sake of simplicity. Parmenides did so and left nothing but empty being,—neither true, nor beautiful, nor virtuous. Simplicity is only one ideal demand and must be pursued in harmony with the other demands.

In science, the demand for simplicity means that entities or hypotheses must not be multiplied. The simplest hypothesis which will meet the facts is regarded as scientifically true. Our theories must be molded upon reality

as we must take it in our experience. While the more complex Ptolemaic astronomy might be made to meet the facts by cumbrous additions, we believe that the simpler Copernican system comes nearer expressing the real stellar relations. We must reduce our theory to the fewest principles which will meet the situation.

In art, as in science, simplicity is a fundamental demand, but here too simplicity must vary with the idea to be expressed. Hamlet cannot be expressed in as simple terms as the clown. The idea must have adequate complexity. Where, however, the inferior artist betrays his lack of genius is in the superfluous details, the obscuring promiscuity. No wonder art has seemed the mere removal of the superfluous, the chiseling away of the extraneous marble. This point of view, however, forgets that marbles do not come veined with Apollos and Venuses and that simplicity itself is meaningless except with reference to the selective idea.

In the moral life, too, simplicity is important. There must be directness of aim, the suppression of irrelevant detail, emphasis of the essential. How many a life loses itself in the mere multitude of busy episodes. The great life differs from the small in its simplicity, as the novel differs from gossip. Here again simplicity is not the only demand. Mephistopheles is more simple than Faust. We must judge life by its type of unity and the adequacy of this unity to harmonize the claims of life. There may be over-specialization as well as too much complexity. The idea alone can decide what details to suppress, what tendencies to emphasize.

Finally, all ideal activity implies *universality* in the sense of social objectivity. This does not mean a consensus of all. It means that those with adequate development and training should be able to share with the agent the ideal object. Ideal activity cannot terminate in mere private states of consciousness. This again can be seen in all the varieties of content which the ideal may take. First of all, there can be no private truth. The processes

of truth must be capable of verification by other observers. Else we have mythology, hallucination, error. Science is primarily a social institution, the outgrowth of our common mental constitution and common situations. Neither can beauty be private. It may require development and culture on the part of the spectators. But if no one but one should ever find an object beautiful, we would probably regard him as having a queer taste. Art, too, is a social institution, our common joy in creative activity and its results. It must define common situations. The social character of the ideal becomes still more striking in the case of the moral life. We may overlook an individual's erroneous thinking, we may laugh at his outlandish taste, but we cannot neglect his anti-social conduct. Our ethical judgments are through and through social judgments,—the balancing of claims from their fitness to a common life. True, the immediate social environment may prove wrong. It may give the hemlock to Socrates and crucify Jesus. But to some social environment our conduct must seem valid and fruitful, if we are at length to be pronounced moral. Only the immoral man claims an ethics of his own, and he only as an exception for himself, not for others. Even the fruits of vice could not be enjoyed in an anti-social world.

We have seen so far how in each mode of ideal activity the ideal is identical. It is the content that individuates. We have examined in turn the four characteristics of the ideal and their application to the different ideal activities. The question may be raised: Cannot these characteristics be still more simplified? This has been attempted in the past. I shall only note one such possibility, and that is the reduction of our ideal categories to the demand for clearness and distinctness. Descartes made this the final criterion of truth. It has been suggested by Hildebrand as the final criterion of art. I believe that such a reduction is impossible if we give this criterion the subjective significance which Descartes attached to it. We must reduce it to its 'cash value,' in terms of

the relations which we discover within the content that embodies the idea. What people *feel* to be clear and distinct is as various as their tastes; and so long as we place the criterion on a subjective basis, we can have no standardization. In fact a criterion which needs to be standardized, as Descartes tried to standardize clearness and distinctness by an appeal to a God who would not deceive, is hardly a criterion. If, on the other hand, we give clearness and distinctness a pragmatic significance, it will be found to imply all the ideal characteristics already stated. Pragmatically, it becomes the clear and distinct expression of an idea in its selected content, or the clarifying of the content in terms of the idea. For such clear and distinct expression must have unity within the parts. The idea must include the facts, or the facts must fall within the idea. There must be organization or the mutual support of the parts. There must be no irrelevant details. There must be social objectivity. Just because the idea is thus pragmatically clear and distinct, it must compel the social approval of the competent.

IV. If ideals are differentiated by their matter and not by their form, we must cast a passing glance at the content of the ideals. From the point of view of content, we may take human nature in its three classic modes as cognitive, as appreciative, and as volitional, bearing in mind that ideals have no application at all until human nature attains the complexity of being consciously selective. Ideal demands, when applied to the relation of ideas to perceptions and to other ideas, become the quest for science. To attain fluency, harmony, simplicity, and universality as regards the agreement of the idea with the constitution which it intends is ideal realization in the realm of knowing. But we have an affective nature, too, and objects must be measured not merely in terms of their existence, but in terms of their value. To make objects fluent, harmonious, clear and distinct, and universal, so far as our human affective nature is concerned, constitutes ideal realization in the realm of appreciation.

Lastly, our volitional claims must be measured in terms of other volitional claims in individual and social history. To fulfill the ideal demands of fluency, harmony, simplicity, and universality in the realm of our volitional conduct, constitutes ideal realization in terms of virtue.

We would have, then, as our criterion the clearness and distinctness of the idea as expressed in the selected object,—the object of thought, the object of feeling, the object of voluntary conduct. When the clearness and distinctness pertains to agreement with a selected constitution, we have truth; when it pertains to appreciation, we have art; when it pertains to the evaluation of will, we have morality. In either case the idea must be adequate, it must be economic, it must leave no outstanding details. The difference is not in the ideal, but in the process or object selected.

It is evident that, of the three, the last overlaps, in a vital way, the other aspects of our nature. Indeed it is impossible except for abstract purposes to treat human nature as divided into compartments. The ideational activity would be but a pale ghost except as floating in the affective and volitional background. In turn, beauty must have meaning, and so involves the ideational side. All creative activity finally must have its spring in the will and its tendencies. If ideals are identical in their form, they also overlap in their matter. They must blend in the unity of the one life.

I have tried to show that our ideal activities are identical as regards their form, the ideal demands to be realized. By this insistence I do not mean to ignore the fact that the ideal, as *realized* in the different modes of human nature, differentiates into unique species. Science, art, and morality are different in the concrete, as truly as they are identical in the abstract. They constitute specific embodiments of the will. When we seek truth, we do not seek beauty as our aim, when we seek beauty we do not seek morality. Satisfactions they all are; and as such they are all included in the good, as Plato pointed

out long ago. But they are different species of the good. Each works within a certain type of material or instrument, through which it realizes its function in making clear and distinct the end. The matter or instrument of science is conceptual relations; the matter of art is concrete imagination; the matter of ethics is impulse. Each sets itself certain limitations, respects the nature of its material. The ideal, in the case of truth-seeking, sets itself the limitation of agreement with a selected constitution, abstract or concrete. That our will sometimes figures as a creative factor in this constitution, that it *makes* ideas come true, does not alter the necessity for our cognitive nature to take account of the facts as made, of discovering the laws in the sequence. While human nature must make ideal demands upon the universe to have truth, it can only succeed provided that the universe lends itself to such idealization. We cannot legislate arbitrarily to nature. We must try to discover clearness and distinctness *within* the relations of nature. That success here is possible is due to the fact that reason is not an arbitrary addition to nature, but that reason grows up in the soil of nature, is nature's reflection upon itself.

In beauty the aim is not the breaking up and systematizing of reality for the discovery of its constitution, but for the sake of social and constant objects of enjoyment,—the joy in activity and contemplation on the part of the developing, historic will. This producing of agreement between nature and our affective-emotional human nature is a different value or satisfaction from that which our search for truth yields. Here too, however, nature and human nature must conspire. As parts of the evolution of nature, we are such and nature is such, that we can discern relations and objects which furnish permanent and spontaneous joy in the play of our faculties. We are made for the sunset as much as the sunset is made for us.

Finally, the ethical end in the concrete is the harmonious adjustment of the individual to the historic social will,—the discovery of right or justice in the measure of

volitional claims. Here, too, life or nature lends itself to such adjustments of claims. Our ideal demands are found to be practical and, in the progressive realization of the meaning of life, the only practical ways of social conduct. Nature again conspires with human nature.

While the concrete values or ways of realization are different for thought, feeling, and character; while they lead to unique satisfaction of the will, they must support and supplement each other, and, because subjected to the same ideal demands, they must fundamentally and ultimately agree with each other. That is, the truth must, without surrendering its specific character as true, also be found beautiful and noble; and so with the other ideal values. "Human nature in its progressive realization can be seen to be fundamentally one, and the realization of the true must be seen to be fundamentally bound up with the right and the beautiful, and all to be species of the good of the entire self, though this does not prevent us from recognizing certain differentia in this ultimate good. The good in the concrete always means proper functioning on the part of human nature in its various relations, the harmonious activity of all its capacities, fluency of life, consistency of transitions. The right means fluency of functioning as regards human individuals in their institutional relations, the proportional equalization of claims. The beautiful means the harmonious and complete expression of our ideal demands in terms of our affective nature, the feeling of fitness and support as regards the various parts of the esthetic object. Truth means the fluent termination of the clear and distinct idea in its intended facts. In the equilibrated life of the individual as a whole, all human nature, — cognitive, emotional, and volitional, — must function with ease and fluency of transition without any conflict of the activity for the true with the realization of the beautiful or the right. They are nevertheless *specific* forms of the good; and, in our imperfect finite develop-

ment there may be provisional discord.”⁴ In the meantime, while the conflict is partial and halting, the unity on the formal side is clear and eternal.

It is clear that, in idealizing human nature as individual, the same ideal demands hold as in the case of the modal types of realization. Here, too, there must be unity, harmony, simplicity, and universality. An ultimate ideal must be found comprehensive enough to include all of our human tendencies. Further, the parts must harmonize or reënforce each other. The part-ideals must work together so as to supplement and interpenetrate within the whole of life. Here, too, there must be simplification and universality. Within life in its wholeness there can be no conflict of reason.

Such wholeness, however, we fail to find within our finite human realization. And as our nature must be loyal to such a wholeness or perfection and cannot rest in the provisional and partial realization, the religious consciousness, the conception and worship of God, must eke out our finite limitations. In our religious loyalty we feel that our ideals are concretely realized. Religion adds no new values to those already mentioned. But it adds the sense of completeness, of unification, and of conservation to our finite ideal strivings. The identity of the abstract form is here exchanged for the unique unity of an individual life, in which form and content are fully blended, where the unity of the ideal purpose embraces all the facts, where the parts all support each other, where there is clearness and distinctness of relationships of parts, and where all mere subjectivity disappears in the organized whole. This final unity of concrete interpenetration is at the other end from the abstract formal ideals which we have considered.

The end of life is to transcend finality, in the sense of abstract ideals with their sense of obligation, and to reach spontaneity,—unity of form and content, perfect activity.

⁴“Truth and Reality,” Macmillan, 1911, pp. 238, 239.

In a perfect being the ideals interpenetrate each other as they clothe themselves in a matter no longer foreign to themselves, but their idealized and transfigured embodiment. This living unity we worship as God.

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THE VALUE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY *

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

I N *The Manchester Guardian* of June 29th, 1911, there occurred the following paragraph: "The nerves of the dockers were in a jumpy state. . . . They were in the mood for anything, either to leave their work or to go on with it, and the bare shouting of the word 'strike' seems to have turned the balance of their minds on the side of leaving it. . . . Men ran along the docks shouting 'Strike! strike!' and with scarcely an inquiry as to why they were striking men stopped work."

Beginners in psychology, I find, commonly lay down the rule, "Every man seeks what after deliberation he proposes to himself as his greatest good," or "Every man does at all times what he thinks will bring him the greatest pleasure in the long run."

Of late years a good many books have been written on such subjects as 'social psychology,' 'crowd psychology,' 'human nature in politics'; and a great part of the authors' endeavor, though not the whole, has been directed towards emphasizing such observations as my first quotation gave, in opposition to the doctrine stated in my second. When we think of it, we must all recognize that we have made similar observations ourselves, and yet the incompatible doctrine keeps possession of part of our minds. The philosophical thinker in each of us is apt

* A lecture delivered to the Leeds Summer School of the Workers' Educational Association, 1911.